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All-In Rebuttal | Millennium
This Week on The Floor
Opinion: a rebuttal to the All-In podcast — should we have a monetary solution to a fiscal problem?
Millennium — one of the world’s most successful hedge funds — is selling ownership stakes. What do you actually get?
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All-In Rebuttal: Should we have a monetary solution to a fiscal problem?
This past week, I listened to an episode of the “All-In” podcast that left me puzzled.
Specifically, I was perplexed by the hosts’ assertions that U.S. growth is tracking above expectations, inflation is moderating…and yet, the Fed should be cutting rates.
In a conversation about the budget deficit, the hosts first said:
David Sacks: “What we’re seeing is good economic news is breaking out all over. So, Q2 GDP is on track for 3.8%, according to the Atlanta Fed. The May jobs report was above expected…inflation down to 2.4%. So, growth is back, inflation is low…”
Translation: growth is strong, unemployment is low, and inflation, as measured by the key statistics the Fed watches, is not out of control.
Yet, the hosts went on to argue that the Fed should be cutting rates. Why? To reduce the budget deficit.
Chamath Palihapitiya: “If [the Fed] cuts by 100 basis points, that’s another $300bn [of savings for the Treasury]…that’s not money we get in, but it’s money we don’t have to spend….we have to figure out how to get Jerome Powell on the side of America versus on the side of what could happen politically…there’s probably a version where he says ‘my gosh, if I do this, it helps Trump, and if I don’t do it, it hurts Trump.’ Practically, that is true, but the reality is, the conditions on the ground justify cutting. ”
Jason Calacanis: “Your claim, I just want to be clear here, is that Powell is playing politics, not working towards the dual mandate, which is very clear: [inflation] at the 2.0 rate and full employment. Your belief is that he’s playing politics, yes?”
Chamath Palihapitiya: “I believe that these decisions are political. I think that the Federal Reserve has veered away from actually controlling the money supply in the best long-term interest of the United States, and more towards what benefits the short term.”
Translation: The Fed needs to cut rates now. Why? So that the short term debt issued by the U.S. government will be at a lower borrowing cost than what we currently pay, thereby reducing the deficit. The hosts are arguing that the Fed is refusing to cut interest rates out of political spite.
Put simply, they are advocating for a monetary solution to a fiscal problem.
Respectfully, I disagree.
While I can’t speak to the specific motivations of individuals within the Federal Reserve, I can speak to what is — and isn’t — the Fed’s job.
It is their job to effect monetary policy to encourage maximum employment and stable prices.
It is not their job to set fiscal policy, reduce government spending, or address the Federal budget.
It’s hard to argue that growth and employment are stronger than expected and in the same breath claim that the Fed needs to urgently cut rates.
When the Fed acted in response to the Global Financial Crisis and COVID and rates WERE at zero, the Treasury was able to borrow at reduced rates.
But Treasury officials at the time (“TBAC”, which stands for the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee) failed to “term out” our debt: meaning, they didn’t sufficiently rebalance their borrowing towards longer maturities (10, 20, and 30 years) vs. shorter maturities (t-bills, 2s, 3s, 5s, and 7s).
So as those short dated borrowings mature, the Treasury has to refinance at higher rates, increasing borrowing costs.
I have argued in the past that failing to term out our debt when rates were low was a serious oversight.
Granted, this is easier said than done. Perhaps we overlearned the lessons of Japan. Perhaps a decade of easy monetary policy created a false sense of security – a kind of “rates will be low forever!” mentality. Whatever the reason, it was a mistake not to rebalance into more longer dated Treasury issuance at lower rates.
The way to correct this mistake is not, I would argue, to now cut rates in a time where — by the hosts’ own admission — growth and employment are strong, and the material impacts of tariffs remain unknown.
Said differently, it’s not the job of the Federal Reserve to solve the budget deficit problem, just like it’s not their job to make your credit card, mortgage payments, or your student loans more affordable.
Moreover, the dollar is already down +/- 10% this year with rates unchanged and only two cuts priced in for the year. Is additional currency weakness (which would likely follow on the heels of a rate cut) really in the country’s best interest?
Central bank independence is structurally critical to the function of a strong economy and government. If you need any further proof, we’ve shared the story behind one hedge fund breaking the Bank of England here:
On Wednesday, the Fed left rates unchanged, citing massive uncertainty in both the growth and inflation outlook.
I would argue that the Fed is acting with restraint in the long term interest of America. The surprise move to cut 50bps last fall was the mistake — in my opinion — and not supported by the data at the time.
It seems in a time of very real uncertainty, they are holding onto as many chips as they can, and looking for incontrovertible evidence that they need to act before moving.
Millennium’s 14bn Valuation:
What Are You Really Buying?
Millennium Management is reportedly selling a 10–15% stake at a $14bn valuation — putting a spotlight on how a top-tier multi-manager hedge fund might be valued.
But what exactly does an investor get for their purchase?
The answer: you’re buying a slice of the management company’s profits.
Said differently, Millennium’s founder Izzy Englander is cashing out and you’re buying into whatever Izzy gets…minus control and voting rights.
But this isn’t your typical hedge fund. So what makes Millennium different from a single-manager hedge fund?
Not Your Average Hedge Fund: The Pod Shop Model
Unlike a traditional single-manager fund, Millennium runs a multi-manager structure (or “pod shop”) with over 300+ portfolio management teams operating semi-independently under a shared infrastructure and risk framework. While reported AUM is $75bn, the firm leverages this capital nearly 10-to-1 (on average… obviously macro strategies could be significantly higher and other strategies lower), meaning it actively manages closer to $750bn in gross capital across asset classes.
This leverage — combined with tight risk limits, centralized controls, and diversification across uncorrelated strategies — has allowed Millennium to consistently deliver attractive risk-adjusted returns. Its flagship fund returned 15.1% net in 2023 and has compounded at ~14% annually since inception.
Cool, so how does the valuation and multiple shake out?
Millennium’s Business Model, Cash Flows and Implied Multiple
When valuing a business, you often run a comps analysis and look at the value relative to some operating metric. In this case we’re focused on firm value relative to cashflow. We can quickly ballpark Millennium's cashflows by understanding their business model.
Let’s start with the expenses. What makes Millennium (and pod shops in general) unique is it employs a “pass-through” expense model for the investment team, meaning headline-grabbing PM pay packages (e.g. $100mm+ for top performers) are charged back to investors. This reduces net performance but ensures Millennium’s base business remains profitable and low risk.
However, as we think about the cash flows and costs outside of those passed through to the investor, the management company pays for costs not borne by the investment teams, which includes those related to accounting, finance, recruiting etc.
Continuing to Revenues, it’s all about FEES.
Unlike traditional hedge funds which charge ~1% management fee and 20% performance fees, Millennium has an either/or model, where you pay at least 1% management fee (on years they lose money) OR 20% of performance.
However, the performance fee is netted against investment team expenses. So, in reality, investors are actually paying quite high fees, which are embedded in that performance fee.
1%+ management fee floor in years where performance is poor.
Performance fee = 20% of gains, net of expenses to management teams.
Valuation Math: How $14bn Pencils Out
Now that we understand the business model, let’s try to estimate what cashflows might look like using current AUM and 2023’s performance as a proxy.
Revenues:
Maximum of:
1.) Management Fee: $75bn x 1% = $750mm
2.) Performance Fee (example using 2023): 20*% x $75bn x 20% = $2.25bn (assuming 20% gross before passthrough of investment team expenses yields 15% net)
Total Fees = $2.25bn (performance fee only)
Operating Margins: 50% (benchmark assumption for a generic hedge fund…Millennium’s could be very different).
Operating Cash Flow = $2.25bn x 50% = $1.125bn
Valuation = $14bn
Implied Multiple = $14bn / 1.125bn = 12.4x
How does this multiple compare to the comps?
Like with any comps analysis, we want to look at similar businesses.
Private Equity firms, many of which are publicly traded, have a similar model. However, PE firms trade at higher multiples, typically 15–20x cash flow. Hedge funds typically warrant lower multiples due to less predictable fees. PE firms are getting 2% management fees baseline annually PLUS 20% performance fees. Plus, private equity firms tend to have longer lockups periods (7 - 10 years), meaning the AUM base is stickier as investors can’t pull their money out easily.
Still, Millennium’s valuation, which while lower than your classic PE firm is higher than your traditional hedge fund due to:
Longer lockups
Blue-chip brand in alternatives
Best-in-class infrastructure and risk management
What You’re Actually Buying
To summarize, if you’re a strategic investor like Petershill or BlackRock who’s considering acquiring this 15% stake, you’re buying a slice of the management company’s profits. You’re gaining access to a stable, high-performing, fee-generating machine —and the Millennium brand. But you're not buying into the AUM directly — just a share of profits generated by managing those assets.